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BREXIT: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGITAL AND 
‘FINTECH’ INDUSTRIES  
Karen Mc Cullagh* 
 
KEY POINTS 
Following the outcome of the historic ‘Brexit’ referendum on 23rd June 2016 in which 
a majority of eligible voters in the UK voted to ‘Leave,’ the United Kingdom is 
potentially on course to leave the European Union, but to ensure continued economic 
success it will seek to maintain a favourable trading relationship with the EU.   
 
This article identifies and critically evaluates the various types of trade deals the UK 
might negotiate upon exit with a particular focus on trade in services since financial 
and digital services are key components of the UK economy.  
 
It also offers both pre and post exit guidance on the data protection permutations of 
each type of trade deal and concludes that post-withdrawal, the UK should ensure 
that its data protection law is fully compliant with Regulation (EU) 2016/679.  
Forging its own data protection path could lead to isolation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the outcome of the historic ‘Brexit’ referendum on 23rd June 2016 in which 
a majority of eligible voters in the UK voted to ‘Leave,’1 the United Kingdom is 
potentially on course to leave the European Union, 2  but to ensure continued 
economic success it will seek to maintain a favourable trading relationship with the 
EU.  This article identifies and critically evaluates the various types of trade deals the 
UK might negotiate upon exit with a particular focus on trade in services since 
financial and digital services are key components of the UK economy.  Also, as 
personal data processing underpins these service industries, particular attention will be 
paid to the data protection implications that would flow from such agreements.  
Specifically, it responds to a call by the UK Government to  
‘consider carefully what might be done either to replace it [Regulation (EU) 
2016/679] if and when it ceases to have effect or, instead, if in the event it 
never comes into force. … the future might take several different forms and we 
need to identify as quickly as possible how to best to react to whatever path is 
eventually chosen’.3 
 
                                                
1 Eligible voters in the UK voted to leave the EU by 52% to 48%. Leave won the majority of votes in 
England and Wales, whereas Remain won the majority of votes in Northern Ireland and Scotland; 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results> 
2 Leading constitutional scholars and legal practitioners share the view that the referendum result is 
merely ‘advisory’ that is, the UK government would need to take further steps to formally notify the 
EU of its ‘decision’ to invoke Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, and commence negotiations 
on a withdrawal agreement from the European Union with the European Council – a process that could 
take two (or more) further years to finalise.  
3 DCMS, Speech by Baroness Neville-Rolfe DBE CMG, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Minister for Intellectual Property, ‘The EU 
Data Protection Package: the UK Government’s perspective,’ at the Privacy Laws & Business Annual 
Conference on Data Protection (4th July 2016), <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-eu-data-
protection-package-the-uk-governments-perspective>. The paper will be of value to her successor, Mr 
Matthew Hancock, MP.  
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THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PERSONAL DATA 
When the UK withdraws from the European Union (EU) it will want to maintain a 
trading relationship with it as the EU is the world's largest trading bloc and the 
world’s largest trader of manufactured goods and services. 4   In 2015, the UK 
exported £223 billion of goods and services to other EU member states, compared to 
£95.1 billion to the US and £15.9 billion to China.5   
The service industries account for approximately 78% of the UK’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP),6 and within the services sector, financial services are key - accounting 
for circa 8% of the UK economic output and approximately 3.5% of employment.7  
Indeed, half of the world’s largest financial firms have their European headquarters in 
the UK and more foreign banks operate in the UK than any other country,8 plus the 
UK facilitates 74% of the EU’s foreign exchange trading and 40% of global trading in 
euros.9  Similarly, the Office for National Statistics has reported that 29% of all 
financial service exports in the G710 are from the UK.   
The financial services sector is supported by ‘Fintech’ industries, that is, companies 
                                                
4 European Commission, EU position in world trade, 2 October 2014, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/index_en.htm>. 
5 ONS, UK Economic Accounts, Quarter 4 2015, Table B6B.  
6 ONS, Statistical bulletin: Index of Services: Apr 2016. 
7 Bank of England, Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, ‘The European 
Union, monetary and financial stability, and the Bank of England,’ 21 October 2015.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Confederation of British Industry, ‘Our Global Future: The Business Vision for a reformed EU,’ (CBI 
Report, London, 2013) 137. 
10  The G7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the 
seven major advanced economies as reported by the International Monetary Fund: their countries 
represent more than 64% of the net global wealth ($263 trillion).  The European Union is also 
represented within the G7. 
Forthcoming: International Data Privacy Law 
4 
 
that use technology to disrupt or make financial services more efficient. 11  The 
Fintech industries are a subsector of digital technology businesses12 which represent a 
further 10% of the UK’s services sector, the highest percentage of any G20 member;13 
and employs 1.56million people.14 The sector had a turnover in 2014 of £161bn and 
this figure is set to increase as the sector grew 32% faster than the rest of the UK 
economy in the period 2010-2014 and is continuing to grow.15  
The potential for further growth of digital technology businesses was acknowledged in 
the Queen’s speech opening parliament a month prior to the Brexit referendum.  In it 
the UK Government announced an intention to introduce legislation to ensure that 
the UK would become ‘a world leader in the digital economy.’16  In so doing, the UK 
hoped to play a leading role in achieving the EU’s goal of developing a ‘digital single 
market’ projected to be worth €415bn euros to the European Union’s economy.17  
The intention was to capitalize on existing success as more than a third of European 
                                                
11 Fintech includes both facilitators (those supporting the technology infrastructure within financial 
institutions) and disruptors (those challenging current systems with new innovative methods) of 
finance.  Examples include: Transferwise: An International money transfer business, and, Funding 
Circle: A peer-to-peer business lending firm.  Ernst & Young, (2014) ‘Landscaping UK Fintech: 
Commissioned by UK Trade & Investment,’ 
<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Landscaping_UK_Fintech/$FILE/EY-Landscaping-UK-
Fintech.pdf>, 3. 
12 Digital technology businesses are defined as business that provides a digital technical 
service/product/platform/hardware, or heavily relies on it, as its primary revenue source; Tech City UK 
& NESTA, (2016) ‘Tech Nation 2016: Transforming UK Industries,’ <http://www.techcityuk.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Tech-Nation-2016_FINAL-ONLINE-
1.pdf?utm_content=buffer2e58f&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buff
er>, 9. 
13 G20 is an international forum for the governments and central bank governors from 19 individual 
countries, namely, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the United 
States, and the European Union (EU). 
14 Note 12, 10. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Cabinet Office, Her Majesty’s most gracious speech to both Houses of Parliament at the State 
Opening of Parliament 2016, 18 May 2016 <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-
2016> 
17 European Commission, A Digital Single Market for Europe: Commission sets out 16 initiatives to 
make it happen, (Press Release, 6 May 2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
4919_en.htm> 
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‘unicorns,’ 18 that is, privately owned ‘start-up’ technology firms worth over $1bn 
(including Asos, Zoopla, and Fintechs such as Transferwise and Funding Circle19) are 
currently based in the UK. 
Both the digital technology businesses and financial services sectors generate and rely 
upon huge volumes of personal data in their operations (e.g. in the form of customer 
records, behavioural, profile and transactional data). Such is the economic value of 
this personal data that it is sometimes referred to as the ‘oil of the Internet and the 
new currency of the digital world.’20  Indeed, personal data is recognised as a highly 
valuable ‘new asset class,’21 and the European Commission has confirmed that ‘the 
value of European citizens’ personal data has the potential to grow to nearly €1 
trillion annually by 2020.’22 Much of this personal data is transferred across national 
boundaries for processing and storage on servers in data centres - as a result, the UK 
hosts the largest data centre market in Europe, and the third largest in the world.23 
Thus, the UK’s ability to develop and sustain economic growth in the digital 
technology and financial sectors of the economy and allied Fintech industries and data 
centres will hinge on a number of inter-related factors that are outlined below. 
                                                
18 GP Bullhound, ‘European Unicorns 2016: Survival of the fittest,’ (June 2016) 
<http://www.gpbullhound.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GP-Bullhound-Research-European-
Unicorns-2016-Survival-of-the-fittest.pdf>, 5, London is home to 18 unicorns – more than double the 
number of the next closest country, Sweden, which is home to seven. 
19 Asos is an online fashion and beauty store; Zoopla is a residential property market website. 
Transferwise is an international money transfer business, and Funding Circle is a peer-to-peer business 
lending firm. 
20 M Kuneva, European Consumer Commissioner Keynote Speech, Roundtable on Online Data 
Collection, Targeting and Profiling, (Brussels, 31 March 2009), <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-09-156_en.htm>, 2.  
21 World Economic Forum, ‘Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class,’ (February 2011) 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf>, 5. 
22 European Commission, (2016) ‘The EU Data Protection Reform and Big Data Factsheet,’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/data-protection-big-data_factsheet_web_en.pdf>, 1. 
23 A Kishore, ‘Should UK data centers fear Brexit?,’ 26 April 2016 
<http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/content-tracks/security-risk/should-uk-data-centers-fear-
brexit/96068.fullarticle>. 
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One factor is ‘passporting’24: at present, once UK-based financial services providers 
such as a bank or insurance company are capitalised and regulated in the UK in 
accordance with EU-wide rules they can provide their services in any other EU or 
EEA25 country directly or through a branch without setting up a further capitalised 
and regulated subsidiary. If, upon Brexit, the UK lost passporting rights and access to 
the internal market (sometimes referred to as the ‘single market’)26 then UK financial 
services providers would have to set up a capitalised subsidiary within an EEA country 
(as is the case with Swiss financial service providers) in order to provide services 
directly or through branches in the whole of the EU.  If that were to occur then 
financial service providers might choose to move their place of establishment outside 
the UK, thereby impacting on the UK’s economy.  
It would also impact on the allied Fintech industries.  For instance, although the UK 
with a population circa 68m is a good sized market in which to start a Fintech 
company, growth would require unimpeded access to the EU’s internal market of 
circa 500m.  Speculation that UK Fintechs could, as an alternative strategy, seek to 
‘scale up’ in other large economies such as the US or China overlooks the fact that 50 
separate state approvals would be required in the US and that it is very difficult for 
foreign companies to succeed in China without entering local partnerships. Thus, if 
UK-based Fintech companies were not able to access the EU’s internal market they 
might decide to maintain access to the internal market by relocating to an EU 
member state, negatively impacting on the UK’s economy.  
                                                
24 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Passporting,’ <https://www.the-fca.org.uk/firms/passporting>. 
25 The EEA includes EU countries and also Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EEA Agreement 
allows EEA countries to participate in the EU’s internal market. 
26 The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 28 countries. It operates an internal 
(or single) market which allows free movement of goods, capital, services and people between member 
states. 
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A further factor that would influence the decision on where to locate is free movement 
of people as the UK suffers from a digital skills shortage; at present over 30% of the 
UK’s Fintech human capital is from the EU and overseas (20.7% are from EU 
countries and 13.3% from non-EU countries), so any restrictions on movement of 
people from EU member states to the UK could impact on firms’ ability to recruit 
suitably skilled workers.27 
An overarching factor that will influence whether the financial services, digital 
technology and allied Fintech and data centre industries decide to remain in the UK 
or relocate to other EU member states is the legal and regulatory environment, 
specifically, the data protection rules that govern the processing and transfer of 
personal data. It is not clear whether the UK will, in a post-Brexit era, choose to 
voluntarily align its data protection laws with those of the EU or seek to develop its 
own framework. There has been some speculation that Brexit will provide an 
opportunity to reduce red-tape concerning data transfers and allow the UK to 
develop a more business-friendly data protection environment as the largely self-
regulatory approach in the online world is often cited as an element in the success of 
US digital technology companies.  
However, if the UK leaves the EEA and does not implement data protection laws that 
closely mirror the provisions in the forthcoming Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Visa may 
have to relocate its data centre operations (with a loss of hundreds of jobs) from the 
UK to an EU country as ‘an agreement in the recent £17.5 billion takeover of Visa’s 
European operations by its American sister company included a stipulation that data 
                                                
27 Wayra, ‘UK more diverse than other major start-up ecosystems, including the US, Silicon Valley, 
NYC and Tel Aviv,’ 14 June 2015, <http://wayra.co.uk/uk-more-diverse-than-other-major-start-up-
ecosystems-including-the-us-silicon-valley-nyc-and-tel-aviv/>. 
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from Visa card transactions should not leave Europe.’28 Other US owned banks such 
as JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Bank of America and Morgan 
Stanley that historically established their EU operations in the UK due to the ease of 
sharing a common language, and use it as a base to ‘passport’ their services to other 
countries as well as process and store personal data ‘are preparing to shift at least 
some of their workers to other EU countries’29 for similar reasons. 
Moreover, if financial services, Fintechs and digital sector industries decided to 
relocate their business from the UK to other EU member states then less personal 
data would be transferred in and out of the UK for processing and storage purposes, 
thereby impacting on the UK’s data centre sector.  
Accordingly, the discussion below provides an overview of data protection in the UK 
and the EU before exploring three aspects of five (Norwegian, Swiss, Canadian, 
Turkish and World Trade Organisation) trade deal models to illustrate the advantages 
and disadvantages of each for the digital technology and Fintech sectors of the UK 
economy.  Firstly, access to the internal market in goods, capital, services (with a 
particular focus on digital and Fintech services) and people (i.e. a focus on the ability 
to recruit IT specialists). Secondly, requirements to follow EU rules and regulations 
(specifically ‘financial passporting’ and data protection) and, thirdly, ability to exert 
influence over future EU laws and regulations (especially the financial services sector 
of the internal market and data protection).  Given that personal data processing 
underpins the financial, digital technology and Fintech industries, the data protection 
implications of each trade deal are also considered.  
                                                
28  M Kleinman, ‘Brexit Jobs Threat At Credit Card Giant Visa,’ Sky News, 1 July 2016, 
<http://news.sky.com/story/brexit-jobs-threat-at-credit-card-giant-visa-10327664> 
29 M Arnold & L Noonan, ‘Banks begin moving some operations out of Britain,’ The Financial Times, 
26 June 2016. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAWS 
The UK first introduced data protection legislation in 1984 in response to pressure 
from the business community, which voiced concerns that the UK would lose cross 
border trade in personal data if it remained a ‘data haven.’ For instance, in 1974, the 
Swedish Data Inspection Board blocked the export of personal data to the UK for the 
preparation of embossed health identity cards. The Swedish authority cited the terms 
of its 1973 Data Act and the UK’s lack of legal protection as justification for the 
restrictions.30 The impetus at the international law level for the government to 
introduce data protection legislation in the UK came with the publication of two 
international legal instruments on data protection in the early 1980s: the OECD 
Guidelines in 198031 (which reaffirmed privacy as a fundamental human right and 
stated that cross-border personal transfers should be subject to adequate safeguards) 
and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 198132 which guaranteed the protection of 
personal data as a separate right granted to an individual. It also provided for the free 
movement of personal data between countries that had ratified the Convention with 
                                                
30 Written assurances by the UK contractor that no copies of the tapes would be made and that their 
security conditions were stringent were not considered adequate; M. Adams, ‘Sweden prohibits 
sending data to UK,’ New Scientist, 17 April 1975, 133. 
31 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data; On 11 July 
2013 the OECD Council adopted a revised Recommendation Concerning Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (‘Privacy Guidelines’), Part 4, Para 17 
states: A Member country should refrain from restricting transborder flows of personal data between 
itself and another country where (a) the other country substantially observes these Guidelines or (b) 
sufficient safeguards exist, including effective enforcement mechanisms and appropriate measures put 
in place by the data controller, to ensure a continuing level of protection consistent with these 
Guidelines. 
32 The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data No 108. 
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restrictions potentially being placed on the movement of data outside that group. 
Only countries whose domestic law provided equivalent safeguards to those defined in 
the Convention could ratify. Thus, when the Convention was opened for signature in 
January 1981, the UK government was motivated to sign and implement it by 
economic considerations - a failure to do so could have given other countries reason to 
divert personal data flows away from the UK thereby undermining the 
competitiveness of British industry.   
Whilst the UK and other countries did enact national data protection laws, it became 
apparent in the late 1980s that national regulators could not ensure compliance with 
national legislation once personal data had left their jurisdiction. For instance, in 
1989, the French data privacy authority (CNIL) blocked the transfer of personal data 
about employees and customers from Fiat France to the parent company, Fiat Italy, 
arguing that the absence of data protection laws in Italy rendered the transfer illegal.33 
As a temporary solution Fiat was required to sign a contract with CNIL that it would 
guarantee privacy protection for any information transferred from France.34  The 
political and economic impact of such personal data transfer disputes led to calls for a 
supra-national data protection law to facilitate and manage cross-border data flows. 
On 11 September 1990, the European Commission responded by a proposing a 
directive on the processing of personal data,35 which, after five years of intense 
politicking and lobbying, came to fruition in the form of Directive 95/46/EC 
                                                
33 J Fauvet, ‘Privacy in the New Europe,’ Transnational Data & Communications Report, (Nov 17-18, 
1989) cited in A Meunier & KR McNamara (eds) Making history: European Integration and 
Institutional change at fifty (OUP, 2007). 
34 Transnational Data and Communications Report, ‘No fiat for Fiat,’ 10 November 1989. 
35 C 277 Official Journal of the EU, 5 Nov 1990, 3.   
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(hereafter ‘the Directive’).36 Each Member state has implemented the Directive’s 
provisions through the domestic implementing laws.  In the UK, the Directive was 
implemented through the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998).37   
The Directive seeks to advance the establishment and functioning of an internal 
market in personal data through harmonization of member states’ data protection 
laws. It seeks to do so through the promotion of two objectives, namely, i) that 
member states should protect an individual’s right to privacy with respect to the 
processing of personal data through the approximation of member states’ (and EEA 
states) laws on the protection of personal data whilst, ii) also facilitating the free flow of 
personal data among the member states and EEA countries.38   
The Directive also recognises that the free flow of personal data to and from ‘third’ 
countries beyond the EU and EEA such as the USA, Canada, and Switzerland is 
necessary for international trade. To ensure that privacy concerns about transfers of 
personal data to such countries do not cripple international trade, Article 4 provides a 
wide scope of territorial application of the Directive whilst Article 25 requires that 
third countries ensure ‘adequate’ protection of the personal data.  Article 4(1)(a) 
applies to the processing of personal data if such processing ‘is carried out in the 
context of the activities of an establishment of the controller’ in the EU.  The CJEU 
interpreted the notion of the processing of personal data ‘in the context of activities of 
an establishment’ very broadly in two recent cases.  In Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González39 the CJEU held 
                                                
36 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L 281/31. 
37 It repealed the Data Protection Act 1984. The DPA 1998 applies to England & Wales, Scotland, N. 
Ireland, and is overseen by the ICO.  
38 Art 1 (1) and (2). 
39 Case C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
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that a data controller owned by an entity located outside the EU may be subject to the 
Directive if it has a subsidiary in the relevant Member state’s territory which carries 
out activities which are inextricably linked.  Thereafter, in Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti 
Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság,40 the CJEU confirmed that the formalistic 
approach whereby organisations are considered to be established solely in the place in 
which they are registered is not the correct approach; rather, the concept of 
establishment must be interpreted broadly so that it applies to a foreign registered 
company which exercises, through stable arrangements, real and effective (albeit 
minimal) activity in that member state. 
Furthermore, Article 25(1) only permits the transfer of personal data to a third 
country with an ‘adequate’ level of protection on the basis that this will ensure that the 
high level of that protection continues where personal data is transferred to a third 
country.41  To this end, a third country can seek an adequacy determination finding 
from the European Commission.  This involves an abstract assessment by the 
European Commission of a third country’s legal and administrative system in relation 
to the protection of personal data in light of the particular circumstances of each 
transfer or set of transfers. 42  If satisfied, the European Commission issues a legally 
binding ‘adequacy decision’ confirming the adequate level of protection in the third 
country, so that transfers of personal data to this third country are lawful. 43  If the 
European Commission finds that the level of protection in a third country is 
inadequate, ‘EU Member states shall take the measures necessary to prevent any 
                                                
40 Case 230/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:639.   
41 Ibid, para 72.  
42 Article 25(4) and (6).  
43 Article 25(4) and (6). 
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transfer of the same kind of personal data to this third country.’44  To date, the 
Commission has issued adequacy decisions in respect of eleven countries.45  
Also, a special sectoral regime to accommodate commercial transfers of personal data 
between the EU and the US (the Safe Harbour agreement) was formally adopted in 
an adequacy decision by the European Commission in 2000. 46  However, in 
Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 47  the CJEU ruled the adequacy 
decision invalid on the basis that it did not take account of overriding US legislation 
that permitted US authorities (such as the National Security Agency) to have access to 
the personal data of EU citizens. The CJEU also ruled that data protection authorities 
in the EU are not (and should not be) fettered by the Commission’s decision on the 
adequacy of US Safe Harbor (or the data protection laws of other third countries) to 
provide protection when personal data is transferred outside of the EU. Rather they 
can and should be free to investigate the adequacy rulings of third countries in 
response to complaints. This prompted the US and EU to negotiate a new scheme 
(the Privacy Shield)48 for transatlantic personal data transfers, which was approved by 
the EU member states representatives,49 clearing the way for the adoption of an 
                                                
44 Article 25(4). 
45 Andorra, Argentina, Canada, the Faroe Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Israel, Jersey, New 
Zealand, Switzerland and Uruguay. 
46 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbor privacy 
principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce [2000] OJ 
L 215/7. 
47 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14 [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, paras 98, 104-106. 
48 U.S. Department of Commerce, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, <https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-
Overview> 
49 Article 31 Committee. 
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adequacy decision by the European Commission on 12th July 2016.50  The Privacy 
Shield agreement includes principles such as security, accountability for onward 
transfer, notice, choice, data integrity, purpose limitation, access, recourse, 
enforcement and liability. Under the new framework, companies transferring personal 
data between the EU and US must commit to stricter data privacy obligations and 
publish them. These privacy commitments will be overseen by the US Department of 
Commerce and enforced by the US Federal Trade Commission. Furthermore, 
companies processing EU human resources data will be bound by the decisions of the 
European Data Protection Authorities.51  
Whilst adequacy decisions and bilateral agreements such as the privacy shield serve a 
useful function they are also complex and time consuming to negotiate and 
administer. Thus, Article 26 sets out a number of conditions, which permit the 
transfer of personal data to a third country that does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection.  First, personal data can be transferred to a third country under one of the 
conditions set out in Article 26(1), which includes: the unambiguous consent of the 
data subject (though the Art 29WP has warned that the consent of the data subject ‘is 
unlikely to provide an adequate long-term framework for data controllers in cases of 
repeated or even structural transfers for the processing in question’) 52  or the 
performance or conclusion of a contract with or in the interest of the data subject.  
Secondly, the supervisory authorities of EU Member states can authorise a transfer or 
                                                
50 European Commission, Commission Implementing Decision Of 12.7.2016 Pursuant To Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the protection provided 
by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, Brussels, 12.7.2016, C(2016) 4176 final. 
51 European Commission Implementing Decision pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Privacy 
Shield,  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision_en.pdf> 
52 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26(1) of 
Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995’ (25 November 2005) WP 114, 11. 
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a set of transfers of personal data subject to adequate safeguards53 in the form of 
binding corporate rules (BCRs), which can be used for international transfers of 
personal data within a multinational company with establishments in third 
countries,54 or through model/standard contractual clauses,55 that is, pre-formulated 
contracts which are pre-approved by the European Commission and ad hoc measures 
such as appropriate contractual clauses.56   
However, although each member state transposed the Directive’s provisions into 
national laws, they did not do so uniformly,57 and this led to fragmented application 
and enforcement.  For instance, some countries added clauses to require breach 
notification; others did not.  Similarly, sanctions have varied widely - Spain has fined 
often and heavily whereas France has rarely imposed fines.58  Some member states 
such as the UK and Ireland transposed provisions in a pragmatic, business-friendly 
way with the effect that many US owned corporates chose to set up a European hub 
or data centre for processing data from all their European offices in either the UK or 
Ireland, as a means of avoiding having to deal with EU data transfer restrictions.  The 
lack of harmonization threatened the EU’s internal market goals, so the European 
Commission instigated infringement proceedings against the UK government for 
                                                
53 Article 26(2). 
54 BCRs are modeled on corporate codes of conduct. They are approved by EU Member states’ 
supervisory authorities. Guidance on the approval process can be found in A29WP, ‘Working 
Document Establishing a Model Checklist Application for Approval of Binding Corporate Rules’ (14 
April 2005) WP108, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2005/wp108_en.pdf> 
55 Article 26(4). 
56 Article 26(2) Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data, ‘Working Document: Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Articles 25 
and 26 of the EU data protection directive’ (24 July 1998), 3. 
57  D Korff, (2002), ‘EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC,’ 
<http://194.242.234.211/documents/10160/10704/Stato+di+attuazione+della+Direttiva+95-46-CE> 
58 C Tankard, ‘What the GDPR means for businesses,’ Network Security Newsletter, June 2016,  
<http://digpath.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/NESE_2016-06_Jun.pdf>, 5.  
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failure to properly implement 11 articles in the Directive into the Data Protection Act 
1998 (DPA 1998),59 and this was a key factor in the decision to propose replacing the 
Directive with a Regulation (as well as a concern that it was no longer fit for purpose 
due to changes in personal data processing technologies).   
 
PRE-WITHDRAWAL DATA PROTECTION: REGULATION (EU) 
2016/679 
The European Union member states recently finalized the text of Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 that will repeal and replace Directive 95/46/EC.  It retains but strengthens 
some of the core principles of Directive 95/46/EC. For instance, the bar for valid 
consent has been raised much higher. It must be fully unbundled from other terms 
and conditions and will not be valid unless freely given, specific, informed, and 
unambiguous, and it must be as easy to withdraw consent as it is to give.60  Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 also introduces several new data subject rights and obligations on data 
processors and controllers (e.g. right to be forgotten61 and data portability62), and 
higher sanctions for non-compliance. Significantly, it has a wide extra-territorial 
application – it will apply not only to controllers and processors of data established in 
the EU that process personal data but also to organisations established outside the 
                                                
59 C Pounder, ‘European Commission explains why UK’s Data Protection Act is deficient,’ 
<http://amberhawk.typepad.com/amberhawk/2011/02/european-commission-explains-why-uks-data-
protection-act-is-deficient.html>; C Pounder, ‘Copy correspondence between Dr Chris Pounder and EU 
Commission & Ombudsman,’ <http://amberhawk.typepad.com/files/dp_infraction_reasons.pdf>; C 
Pounder, ‘European Commission raises infraction threat to UK on failing to implement Directive 
95/46/EC properly via the Data Protection Act,’ 
<http://amberhawk.typepad.com/amberhawk/2014/10/european-commission-raises-infraction-threat-to-
uk-on-failing-to-implement-directive-9546ec-properly.html>; The infraction proceedings are ongoing.  
60 Articles 4(11) and 6(1) (a). 
61 Art 17. 
62 Art18. 
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EU, if they process personal data relating to the offering of goods or services to 
individuals in the EU, or if they monitor the behaviour of individuals in the EU/EEA 
countries, for example, through cookies.63  Additionally, it requires non-EU data 
controllers to designate a representative in the EU.64  The representative must be 
established in an EU member state where relevant data subjects are located and act as 
a point of contact on behalf of the non-EU controller in respect of all issues relating to 
compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679.  
It also includes the introduction of an accountability requirement for data 
controllers, 65  an increased level of fines, 66  and a ‘one stop shop’ approach to 
regulatory oversight,67 that is, organisations will be regulated by the data protection 
regulator in the place of their main establishment (i.e. the main administrative 
location in the EU unless the main decisions about data processing are taken in a 
different Member state in which case that will be the main establishment).  Individuals 
will be able to make complaints in their member state at which point that regulator 
will engage in a cooperation procedure which will be settled by the newly established 
European Data Protection Board in the event of disagreement.  Member state 
                                                
63 Article 3 (2). 
64 A representative is not required if data processing: (1) is occasional, (ii) does not extend to the 
processing of special categories of data (such as biometric data, criminal convictions and/or details of 
an individual’s race, ethnicity, political or religious opinions or sexual orientation) on a large scale, and 
(iii) is unlikely to result in risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons taking into account the 
nature, context, scope and purpose of the processing.  
65 Article 24 requires that organisations implement ‘appropriate technical and organisational measures’ 
to be able to ‘demonstrate’ their compliance with the Regulation, which shall also include ‘the 
implementation of appropriate data protection policies’. Therefore, in preparing for the Regulation, 
organisations will have to implement not only internal and publicly-facing policies, records and 
notices, but also technical measures, and fundamental personnel and strategic changes to their 
processing operations.  
66 A two-tiered sanctions regime will apply. Art 83 (5) & (6). Breaches of some provisions by 
businesses, which law makers have deemed to be most important for data protection, could lead to 
fines of up to €20 million or 4% of global annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever 
is the greater, being levied by data watchdogs. For other breaches, Art 83 (4) states that the authorities 
could impose fines on companies of up to €10m or 2% of global annual turnover, whichever is greater. 
67  Art 77 will allow individuals to make complaints about the misuse of their data with the Data 
Protection Authority (DPA) in their home country, rather than where the company is based. 
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regulators will also be able to deal with any issues arising in their own States subject to 
a cooperation procedure.  
As an EU Regulation, it would be directly applicable in the UK without the need for 
implementing domestic UK legislation as of 25th May 2018. Although Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 will repeal and replace Directive 95/46/EC, it will not repeal the 
Data Protection Act 1998 as domestic legislation can only be amended or repealed by 
the UK Government.  Since it is highly likely that the UK will not have completed the 
‘exit process’ by 25th May 2018, the UK Government will initially be obligated to 
amend the DPA 1998 to bring UK law in line with the requirements in Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679.68  UK based businesses will therefore need to continue to prepare for 
and be in a position to comply with provisions in Regulation (EU) 2016/679, even if 
continued membership is expected to be short-lived. 
 
 
UK DATA PROTECTION POST BREXIT 
The situation will change if or when the UK leaves the EU.  Withdrawal from the EU 
will afford the UK an opportunity to pause and reflect on the potential data 
protection implications of the UK seeking a trading relationship in which they would 
either be obliged to implement Regulation (EU) 2016/679, choose to do so 
voluntarily, or opt to devise and implement their own data protection law.  Given that 
some of the provisions in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 were hugely contested by the 
                                                
68 Consolidated Version of The Treaty on The Functioning of The European Union (TFEU), Part Six, 
Institutional And Financial Provisions, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/1, Article 288; 
Until the UK completes the process of withdrawal from the European Union, it remains subject to all of 
its EU obligations, including the obligation to transpose EU Regulations (such as Regulation (EU) 
2016/679) into UK law. 
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UK - for instance, Mr Ken Clarke MP, objected to the right to be forgotten,69 and 
several MEP’s actively lobbied for amendments requested by digital technology 
companies such as Amazon, and Google,70 some have suggested that pressure will be 
brought to bear on the Government for the UK to introduce a data protection 
framework that is less burdensome for small businesses,71 and is more business-friendly 
in general.72  One might think that the introduction of less stringent data protection 
rules would make the UK more attractive as a trading partner. However, that would 
not necessarily be the case for two reasons.  Firstly, the EU data protection framework 
(both Directive 95/46/EC and the forthcoming Regulation (EU) 2016/679) are 
regarded as “gold standard”. 73  Indeed, ‘over half the countries in the world now have 
a data protection and/or privacy law, and most are strongly influenced by the 
European approach.’74  Complying with a separate, different, UK data protection 
framework would present an unwelcome additional compliance burden for businesses 
operating on a transnational basis.  Secondly, the adequacy and extra-territorial reach 
elements of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 will apply to UK based businesses that process 
the personal data of EU citizens.   
Given that UK-based businesses processing personal data of EU citizens will continue 
to be obliged to comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, having to comply with a 
                                                
69 Ministry of Justice, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rt. Hon Kenneth Clarke MP, 
Speech at the British Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, ‘Data protection,’ 26 May 2011, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/kenneth-clarke-warns-on-eu-data-protection-rules> 
70 LobbyPlag  <http://lobbyplag.eu/map> 
71 Federation of Small Businesses, ‘Manifesto European Elections 2014,’ (February 2014).   
72 D Castro, ‘Brexit Allows UK to Unshackle Itself from EU’s Cumbersome Data Protection Rules,’ 20 
July 2016, <http://globaldatinginsights.com/2016/07/20/brexit-allows-uk-to-unshackle-itself-from-eus-
cumbersome-data-protection-rules/> 
73 G Buttarelli, ‘The EU GDPR as a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard,’ (2016) 6 
International Data Privacy Law, 77-78 
74 G Greenleaf, ‘Global Data Privacy Laws Countries, with European Laws Now a Minority,’ (2015) 
Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 109, 133. 
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separate UK data protection framework would represent an additional legal 
compliance burden – one that would add to the cost of doing business in the UK and 
put UK businesses at an economic disadvantage. Accordingly, the critical analysis of 
the implications of the different trade models for financial and digital services below 
will also consider the data protection implications of each trade model.  
 
POST-EXIT TRADE MODELS & DATA PROTECTION 
IMPLICATIONS  
The UK is the first member state to seek to withdraw from the European Union since 
its creation.  Three former territories of European member states withdrew (Algeria, 
Greenland and Saint Barthélémy).  Whilst not directly comparable, the experience of 
Greenland is instructive in that it withdrew but sought to maintain a trading 
relationship.75  This small country has a population of approximately 56,000 and its 
economy is dominated by a single industry, fishing (90%).  Even so, the withdrawal 
and renegotiation was lengthy and complex:  
“unpicking EU membership was a long and laborious process. It took three 
years or so, even when there was just one industry involved, and one product 
whose access to the European market had to be negotiated…The other major 
downside is that leaving the control of Brussels did not free them from what 
the ‘Leave’ campaign call the dead-hand of Brussels regulation. Far from it. 
They are no longer at the table when fisheries are discussed, but if they are to 
sell into the single-market - which they must - then every rule applies to them 
                                                
75 It remains subject to the EU treaties through association of Overseas Countries and Territories with 
the EU. This was permitted by the Greenland Treaty - a special treaty signed in 1984 to allow its 
withdrawal. 
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as much as it does to us”.76 
 
At present, it is not clear what type of post-withdrawal trading relationship the UK 
might seek to have with the EU, as the government explicitly ruled out contingency 
planning;77 and the ‘Leave’ campaign did not outline a clear plan,78 rather it indicated 
dissatisfaction with the current UK-EU relationship on the basis that the UK could 
not fully control immigration: ‘we need to take back control of our borders so we can decide who 
comes here – and who can’t,’79 and had ceded sovereignty to the EU on some aspects of 
law making and lost the ability to independently negotiate trade relationships with 
other countries: ‘We should negotiate a new UK-EU deal based on free trade and friendly 
cooperation. We end the supremacy of EU law…We regain our seats on international institutions like 
the World Trade Organisation so we are a more influential force for free trade and international 
cooperation.’80  
Possibilities include exiting the EU but becoming a member of the EFTA and EEA 
thereby retaining access to the internal market (the Norwegian model), exiting the EU 
and joining the EFTA but not the EEA, with limited access to the internal market and 
relations governed by a framework of bilateral agreements (the Swiss model), or total 
exit from the EU and the internal market. This latter option could see the UK seek to 
negotiate free trade agreements with individual countries (the Canadian model), or 
join the Customs Union (the Turkish model), or access the EU market under the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. The analysis of each trade model is 
                                                
76 J Mates, ‘What lessons can the UK learn from Greenland leaving the EU?,’ ITV News, 10 May 2016 
<http://www.itv.com/news/2016-05-10/what-lessons-can-the-uk-learn-from-greenland-leaving-the-
eu/> 
77 G Parker, ‘Tories Shun Brexit Contingency Plans’, Financial Times, 1 December 2015. 
78 See the Leave Campaign website for further information <http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org> 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.   
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accompanied by discussion of the different data protection implications that would 
flow from each, with particular attention paid to transfers of personal data both within 
the EU/EEA and to third countries.  
 
 
The ‘Norwegian’ EFTA & EEA model 
The UK could leave the European Union but join the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) whose current members, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, 
trade with the EU via the European Economic Area (EEA).81  This model has a few 
economic advantages that might, at first glance, appear attractive to those tasked with 
establishing a new trade relationship who are not in favour of ‘ever closer union.’  For 
instance, EEA membership does not oblige countries to participate in monetary 
union, the EU’s common foreign and security policy, common agricultural policy, or 
justice and home affairs policies.  Also, whilst there is free trade within the EEA, 
members are not part of the EU’s customs union, which means that they can set their 
own external tariff and conduct their own trade negotiations with countries outside 
the EU. Notably, there is a financial cost associated with being a member of the EEA 
and internal market - members have to make a substantial contribution to the EU’s 
regional development funds and contribute to the costs of the EU programmes in 
which they participate, such as co-operation on science and research activities.82  For 
instance, in 2011, Norway’s contribution to the EU budget was £106 per capita, only 
                                                
81 The European Economic Area (EEA) was established by several Agreements signed in 1992. It 
allows the three EEA States to largely participate to the EU's internal market.  Admitting the UK as a 
new State to the EEA would require an accession treaty, which would have to be concluded, not only 
by the EU and the UK but also by each of the thirty EEA Member states (twenty seven from the EU 
and three from EEA).  
82 Art 116 EEA Agreement. 
Forthcoming: International Data Privacy Law 
23 
 
17% lower than the UK’s net contribution of £128 per capita.83 
There are parallels between the UK and Liechtenstein economies in that both are 
mixed economies, with large financial and service sectors.  An EFTA trade deal would 
be good for UK financial and allied Fintech services because financial regulation 
would stay largely the same and passporting rights in the EU internal market would 
be maintained.  This would allow UK based Fintechs to continue to ‘scale up’ their 
operations across Europe using e-money licenses and passporting arrangements.  Also, 
the UK would continue to participate in EU programmes and strategies, including the 
‘Digital Single Market Strategy,’84 which would be of benefit to the UK’s growing 
digital technology sector.    
However, to join the EEA, the UK would have to commit to complying with the four 
freedoms laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (i.e. the 
free movement of goods, services, people and capital) as these are incorporated in the 
EEA agreement.85  The UK could seek to partially disapply provisions in the EEA 
Agreement regarding the continued free movement of people, using Art 112, that is: 
‘serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional 
nature liable to persist are arising,’ 86 as Liechtenstein did when it first joined the EEA.  
The UK could seek to further mirror Liechtenstein’s experience in introducing a 
quota system to control the number of people allowed to enter the country to restrict 
                                                
83 House of Commons, (2013), ‘Leaving the EU,’ Research Paper 13/42, 1 July 2013. 
84 See note 16. 
85 OJ 2012/C 326/01; The EEA was established in 1994 to give European countries that are not part of 
the EU a way to become members of the internal market.  
86 Art 112 EEA, is intended to be an ‘emergency safeguard provision for highly specific obligations;’ 
Prof Dougan offered the view that it would be inappropriate to use Art 112 as a measure to exempt the 
UK from free-movement requirements.  He viewed Liechtenstein as a special case and stated that the 
UK does not meet the same criteria. House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The UK’s future 
economic relationship with the European Union, 5th July 2016, 
<http://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/cb083c53-3998-4f3a-8eca-e114e3dbdf0b> (11.45mins onwards). 
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intra-EU migration yet be able to draw upon the IT talent of EU citizens to address 
the UK’s IT skills shortage.  However, although Liechtenstein has been permitted to 
introduce a quota system controlling the number of people allowed to enter the 
country due to it being ‘a very small inhabitable area of rural character with an 
unusually high percentage of non-national residents and employees,’ 87 it is by no 
means certain that the EU would countenance a restriction on intra-EU migration to 
the UK as part of any agreement as the countries are vastly different: Liechtenstein is 
61 sq mi in size with a population of 37,340 compared to UK 93,628 sq mi, with a 
population of 65,102,385. Moreover, a unilateral decision by the UK to limit the free 
movement of persons under the EEA agreement would be subject to review by the 
EEA Joint Committee88 who could rule on the ‘scope and duration’ of the safeguard. 
The UK would be advised that Art 112 is intended to be an ‘emergency measure’ and 
that the EEA agreement permits the EU to implement ‘proportionate rebalancing’ 
measures89 such as restricting ‘passported’ financial services exports by the UK to the 
EU (the scope of such measures would also be subject to review by the EEA Joint 
Committee), so any attempt to limit movement of people could result in an economic 
cost, as well as political and social controversy.  
In the longer term, this model may not be appropriate for the UK because EEA 
countries such as Norway have to implement EU rules concerning the internal 
market, including legislation regarding employment, consumer protection, 
environmental law, financial services and competition policy, but have no influence in 
                                                
87 Liechtenstein issues residence permits for 56 workers and 16 non-workers each year, half of which 
are decide by a lottery held twice each year. This arrangement was given formal status by an 
amendment to Annex VIII of the EEA Agreement, setting out what were called “sectoral adaptations,” 
cross-referred to Annex V on the free movement of workers. The measures are subject to review every 
five years.  
88 Art 113 EEA. 
89 Art 114 EEA. 
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the legislative drafting process as they do not have voting power or formal access to 
the decision-making process since rules of the internal market are set by the EU not 
the EEA.90  In particular, the UK would have to submit to the rule that the EEA 
States ‘speak with one voice’ in the Joint Committee; in effect one EEA State has the 
ability to block the transposition into EEA law of a new or revised EU law even if the 
other EEA States would urgently need that transposition for economic reasons.91   
Overall, whilst this trade model does not offer all the benefits associated with being a 
member of the European Union, it is perhaps the next best alternative trade model for 
the digital economy and financial services sectors of the UK economy. Thus, the 
potential data protection implications of such a trade deal are considered below. 
 
Data	protection	implications	of	the	‘Norway’	model	
Data protection within the internal market has been harmonized and is part of the 
EEA agreement. 92   Accordingly, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 would be directly 
applicable in the UK as an EEA country.  In the short-to-medium term, this model 
would be advantageous, as it would provide legal certainty for UK established 
businesses.  UK established data controllers and processors would continue to be 
obligated to ensure fair and lawful processing of personal data.  From a digital 
technology and Fintech perspective this model is advantageous as transfers of personal 
                                                
90  Agreement on The European Economic Area, OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994, Article 102, at 
<http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/eea/the-eea-
agreement/Main%20Text%20of%20the%20Agreement/EEAagreement.pdf> 
91 Article 93 EEA Agreement. 
92 EEA, Article 36, Annex XI, data protection laws are to be implemented into the internal legal order 
of EEA states. A special adaptation text was adopted at the time of incorporation of the Data Protection 
Directive, stating that Commission decisions pursuant to Article 31 of the Directive, concerning e.g. 
transfer of data to third countries should apply temporarily as regards the EFTA EEA states without 
regard to pending incorporation of those Acts into the Agreement, provided that the EFTA EEA states 
would not decide otherwise and inform the Commission accordingly; See, Joint Committee Decision 
No 83/1999 (OJ No L 296, 23.11.2000, p. 41 and EEA Supplement No. 43, 23.11.2000, p. 112 (I) and 
p. 81 Del 2 (N)), e.i.f. 1.7.2000.  
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data from EU and EEA countries would continue without restrictions. It would avoid 
the problems outlined above, wherein Visa stipulated that the personal details of its 
European customers must be stored in data centres in Europe, in response to concerns 
about privacy and data protection in third countries.  
Under Regulation (EU) 2016/679, transfers of personal data from the UK to non-
EEA countries would be prohibited in the absence of an adequacy determination by 
the European Commission. 93  Model clauses would continue to provide an alternative 
mechanism for transfers from the UK to non-EEA countries that have not obtained 
an adequacy finding from the Commission, subject that is, to the outcome of a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU on the legal status of data transfers under such 
clauses.94  Similarly, UK data controllers could continue to use Binding Corporate 
Rules (BCRs) for data transfers to non-EEA countries.  These would continue to be 
reviewed and authorized by the ICO (UK data protection regulator).  Furthermore, 
UK based data controllers and processors would be permitted to use the ‘Privacy 
Shield’ for transfers to the US.  The Regulation (EU) 2016/679 ‘one-stop-shop’ would 
apply, that is, responsibility for the supervision of processing of data controllers or 
data processors whose ‘main establishment’ is in the UK (they may have a presence in 
other Member states) would be allocated to the ICO.  Also, should the UK opt to join 
the EEA, individuals and UK courts would be obliged to refer data protection matters 
to the EFTA Court.  Under the EEA Agreement rules, the EFTA Court ‘pays due 
                                                
93 Under Article 45 of Regulation 2016/679, the European Commission may assess whether a country 
has an adequate level of data protection by taking into account: the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and other legislative enactments and case law, he existence and 
effectiveness of an independent supervisory authority with adequate enforcement powers, and 
International commitments the country has entered into.  
94An Coimisinéir Cosanta Sionraí, ‘Statement by the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner in 
respect of application for Declaratory Relief in the Irish High Court and Referral to the CJEU,’ 25 May 
2016, <https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/25-05-2016-Statement-by-this-Office-in-respect-of-
application-for-Declaratory-Relief-in-the-Irish-High-Court-and-Referral-to-the-CJEU/1570.htm> 
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account to the principles laid down by the European Court of Justice’s case law’,95 so 
the UK would, in effect, continue to be influenced by rulings made by the EU courts 
on Regulation (EU) 2016/679.  The Fintech and digital economy startups that have 
established European bases in the UK would welcome these measures. 
In the longer term this trade model has, however, several data protection 
disadvantages relating to a loss of regulatory influence.  Firstly, as outlined above, 
EEA countries such as Norway and Liechtenstein are ‘rule takers rather than rule 
makers,’ that is, they have to implement EU rules concerning the internal market, 
including financial services and data protection but have no influence in the legislative 
drafting process as they do not have voting power or formal access to the decision-
making process since rules of the internal market are set by the EU not the EEA.96  
Thus, the UK Government would lose legislative influence as it would not have a say 
or voting rights in respect of any future amendments to Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 
which could be significant given that the UK has tended to favour a pragmatic, 
business friendly approach to data protection more so than some of its EU member 
state counterparts.  Relatedly, the ICO could become a less influential body as it 
would not have participation rights in respect of membership of the forthcoming 
European Data Protection Board (a reconfigured Article 29 Working Party97), an EU 
                                                
95 To avoid a race to the bottom and forum shopping, the drafters of the EEA Agreement formulated 
homogeneity rules that essentially bind the EFTA Court to follow relevant CJEU case law; C. 
Baudenbacher, ‘The EFTA Court and Court of Justice of the European Union: Coming in Parts But 
Winning Together,’ pp. 183-203 in A. Rosas (ed), The Court of Justice and the Construction of 
Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law - La Cour de Justice et la Construction 
de l'Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013). 
96 Agreement on The European Economic Area, OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994, Article 102, 
<http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/eea/the-eea-
agreement/Main%20Text%20of%20the%20Agreement/EEAagreement.pdf> 
97 The Article 29 Working Party, whose members were the EU’s national supervisory authorities, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (“EDPS”) and the European Commission has been transformed 
into the “European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”), with similar membership but an independent 
Secretariat. 
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body with legal personality and extensive powers to determine disputes between 
national supervisory authorities, to give advice and guidance and to approve EU-wide 
codes and certification.98   
In summary, the UK would benefit from passporting and access to the internal 
market but would lose the right to influence the laws on the internal market (including 
data protection) or the bodies responsible for their implementation.  
 
 
The ‘Swiss’ EFTA & bilateral treaties model 
The UK could seek to replicate the arrangement Switzerland has in place in that it 
could negotiate to leave the European Union and join the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) (but not the EEA), which provides for free trade with the EU in 
all non-agricultural goods, and negotiate bilateral treaties to govern other trade 
relations with the EU.  For example, Switzerland has entered into bilateral treaties 
with the EU on insurance, air traffic, pensions, and fraud prevention, to name a few.99 
The combined effect of EFTA membership and bilateral agreements covering 
technical barriers to trade is a similar level of goods market integration with the EU 
for Switzerland as EEA countries.  The perceived advantage of the bilateral treaty 
approach is that it would allow the UK the flexibility to choose EU initiatives in which 
it wished to participate, and freedom to remain uninvolved in those that are not of 
economic, social or political interest.  Another positive aspect of this model is that 
Switzerland has made lower contributions to the EU in respect of regional funding 
                                                
98 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Recitals 139 & 140, and Chapter VII Section 3. 
99 Approximately 120 bilateral agreements currently exist between the EU and Switzerland; European 
Commission, Trade, Countries, Switzerland,  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/switzerland/index_en.htm> 
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and the costs of the programmes in which it participates: approximately £53 per 
capita, which is 60% lower than the UK’s net contribution per capita.100  Lower 
funding contributions would be attractive to the UK. 
Nevertheless, there are legal, social, and political costs to this model. For instance, 
Switzerland has almost no influence over the design of the EU programmes in which 
it participates. Additionally, the treaties negotiated with the EU require Switzerland to 
implement policies and legislation set by the EU.  At present, there is also free 
movement of people between Switzerland and the EU, although in February 2014, 
Switzerland voted in a referendum to impose restrictions on immigration from the EU 
that would violate its agreement with the EU on free movement of people.  It remains 
to be seen whether or how the Swiss government will implement this vote and what 
will be the consequences for Swiss-EU relations.  If future Swiss–EU trade relations 
become contingent on free movement of people, the Swiss bilateral trade model will 
be a less attractive option for UK negotiators who want freedom of movement for IT 
workers to address the UK’s digital skills shortage yet otherwise restrict immigration 
to the UK. 
The factor that is, however, most likely to persuade UK trade negotiators that this is 
not the most appropriate model for the UK is that Switzerland and the EU have not 
reached a comprehensive agreement covering trade in services.  Consequently, 
Switzerland is not part of the internal market for services and Swiss financial 
institutions wanting to serve the EU market have to do so through subsidiaries based 
in EU Member states (predominantly London, at present).  If the UK were unable to 
secure a bilateral agreement on trade in services it could, in theory, allow the UK 
regulator (Financial Conduct Authority) to make its own decisions about what 
                                                
100 House of Commons, (2013), ‘Leaving the EU,’ Research Paper 13/42, 1 July 2013. 
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regulation is best for UK financial firms and result in a reduced regulatory burden for 
UK Fintechs since EU rules would no longer apply.  However, it is more likely that, if 
the UK lost its passport, this would encourage US and other foreign owned banks 
currently based in the UK to move trading operations to Paris and Frankfurt and 
back-office data centre operations to Dublin.  Thus, a loss of passporting rights would 
negatively impact on the financial and digital services sectors and allied Fintech and 
data centre industries.  In effect, it could drive Fintech investment and data centres 
from the UK into other European countries, with a related loss of jobs and negative 
impact on the UK economy. 
A trade deal of this type may not even be on the negotiating table as a possible option 
as it was originally designed to be a unique transitional measure pending the full 
membership of Switzerland in the EU and the EU has expressed concerns about its 
long-term viability (it has commenced negotiations, which if implemented, would go 
further than the provisions of the EEA, i.e. being more demanding for Switzerland 
than for the EEA Members).101  The EU may not entertain any similar relationship 
with the UK, particularly if it is unwilling to accommodate free movement of people.  
Even so, the potential data protection implications of the Swiss trade model are 
considered below as they illustrate how and why the UK might voluntarily choose to 
closely mirror the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 in any post-withdrawal 
data protection legislation.    
 
                                                
101 In May 2014, the EU commenced negotiations with Switzerland on "an international agreement on 
an institutional framework governing bilateral relations with the Swiss confederation" which, if agreed 
would require future agreements to include provisions giving a role of surveillance to the European 
Commission, as well as a possible judicial control to the EU Court of Justice. The agreement would 
also impose on Switzerland a maximum time-limit for the implementation in Swiss law of changes to 
the acquis communautaire decided unilaterally by the EU. 
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Data	Protection	Implications	of	the	Swiss	model	
The EU data protection framework governing EU and EEA countries does not 
extend to EFTA only countries, so Switzerland, as a ‘third’ country was not obligated 
but rather chose voluntarily to mirror the provisions Directive 95/46/EC in its 
legislation (The Swiss Federal Data Protection Act 1992).  It further sought and 
received an “adequacy” decision from the European Commission,102 allowing Swiss 
entities to freely transfer and receive personal data from its nearest and most 
economically important trading partners - EU member states.  Swiss entities also use 
model clauses and binding contract rules to transfer data to non-EEA countries.  Of 
note is that although Switzerland is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), its case law has had a significant influence on 
Swiss legislation.  For instance, after the CJEU invalidated the European 
Commission’s Decision on the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor arrangement, 103 the Swiss 
Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC) declared that the 
Swiss-US Safe Harbor agreement (which mirrored the EU-US Safe Harbor 
agreement but also covered personal data of legal entities) did not provide a sufficient 
legal basis for exporting data from Switzerland to the U.S.104 
                                                
102 2000/518/EC Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided in 
Switzerland (notified under document number C (2000) 2304), Official Journal of the European 
Communities L 215/1, 5/08/2000 P. 0001 - 0003 
103 The Safe Harbor Agreement was negotiated between the US Department of Commerce and the 
European Commission to enable businesses to transfer EU data to the US in compliance with the EU 
Directive 95/46/EC (now being replaced by Regulation (EU 2016/679). Only organizations that self-
certified against Safe Harbor privacy principles were legally permitted to transfer EU data to the US. In 
Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, An 
Austrian Facebook user lodged a complaint with the Irish DPA after the Snowden revelations had 
shown that his data and that of other EU citizens had been accessed by US intelligence services. The 
Safe Harbor Agreement was invalidated.  
104 Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC), Further information on the 
transfer of data to the USA, 28 June 2016, 
<http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/datenschutz/00626/00753/00970/01325/index.html?lang=en> 
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The degree of influence of EU data protection law on Switzerland will increase as of 
25th May 2018, when Regulation (EU) 2016/679 will not only be applicable for Swiss 
companies based in the EU (or their subsidiaries in the EU), but also for Swiss based 
companies that are offering goods or services to EU data subjects as the extra-
territorial scope of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 will also include organizations 
processing personal data of EU data subjects, or organisations that monitor the 
(online) behaviour of EU data subjects.105  Therefore, numerous Swiss organizations 
that currently have no local presence in the EU will be within the territorial scope of 
the Regulation.  If, going forward, Switzerland does not revise the Swiss Federal Data 
Protection Act 1992 to reflect changes in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 then the 
European Commission could revoke its adequacy decision, after determining that as a 
third country, Switzerland no longer has comprehensive data protection laws of an 
equivalent standard.  To avoid this, the Swiss Federal Council outlined that ‘it is 
economically important for Switzerland to be recognized as a country with an 
appropriate data protection level for the EU,’ and engaged the Federal Department of 
Justice and Police to draft a revised Data Protection Act which gives ‘due 
consideration of the EU data protection regulation.’  The revised Act is scheduled to 
come into effect around the same time as Regulation 2016/679.106 
If the UK chose to withdraw from the EU, join the EFTA and negotiate bilateral 
agreements with the EU as Switzerland has, then it might also seek to replicate the 
Swiss legal arrangements regarding personal data transfers to the EU, EEA and other 
countries.  In the unlikely event that the UK withdraws from the EU prior to 25th 
May 2018, that is, whilst Directive 95/46/EC is still in force, it could choose to follow 
                                                
105 Article 3 (2). 
106 Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police, Federal Council Press Release: ‘Data Protection 
Should be Strengthened,’ 1 April 2015, 
<http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-04-010.html> 
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the Swiss model in seeking an adequacy decision from the European Commission.  
One might expect the UK to easily obtain an ‘adequacy’ decision given that it has 
implemented Directive 95/46/EC into domestic law in the form of the DPA 1998.  
However, the DPA 1998 will almost certainly not be adequate, because as outlined 
above, the UK was (and remains) the subject of infringement proceedings for deficient 
implementation of key provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, the effect of which were a 
more pragmatic and business-friendly approach to data protection than most other 
EU Member states.107  
Equally, if the UK withdraws from the EU after the 25th May 2018, it should ensure 
that any revisions to the DPA 1998 closely mirror provisions in Regulation (EU) 
2016/679, otherwise an adequacy determination may not be forthcoming from the 
Commission.  A positive adequacy determination cannot, however, be predicted with 
certainty at this stage given the UK’s (and Information Commissioner's Office’s) 
persistent pushback on large tracts of the draft Regulation that they considered either 
overly process-driven or unnecessarily protective of the individual, as such views could 
influence any post-withdrawal amendments made to the DPA 1998.   
In making an adequacy decision the European Commission would also be influenced 
by the CJEU decision in Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, which 
questioned the adequacy of the protection afforded to EU data subjects’ personal data 
when transferred to the US, 108   as well as the forthcoming preliminary reference in 
respect of the Joined cases Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v Tom Watson, Peter Brice, Geoffrey Lewis.109  These factors would also 
                                                
107 See note 57. 
108 See note 101. 
109 CJEU, Cases C‑203/15 and C‑698/15 (forthcoming); The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers 
Act (DRIPA) 2014 requires internet and phone companies to keep their communications data for a year 
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impact on any negotiations to devise a UK-US privacy shield.  Whilst there could be 
support in both the US and UK for a Regulation-lite framework in relation to data 
flows regarding UK and US citizens, the UK will likely be required to demonstrate 
that the personal data flows it receives from EU member states will not be transferred 
on to the US under less stringent terms.  
Pending an adequacy decision by the Commission (under either Directive 95/46/EC 
or Regulation (EU) 2016/679), UK based companies operating in the EU, or indeed 
an EU-based company would need to revise the methods they use to transfer data to 
the UK (such as Model Clauses or Binding Corporate Rules).  This could increase the 
regulatory burden and costs of UK established businesses that process personal data of 
EU citizens since these approved mechanisms for lawfully transferring data add an 
additional administrative layer and vary between jurisdictions.  For example, some 
Member states, such as Spain, require organisations to obtain prior authorisation 
from the local supervisory authority before making any such transfer. 
Moreover, as a ‘third country,’ some provisions in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 such as 
the One-Stop-Shop, the European Data Protection Board and Binding Corporate 
Rules, will not be applicable in the UK (nor will they be in Switzerland).  For instance, 
although UK data controllers could continue to rely on Binding Corporate Rules for 
data transfers to third countries, the ICO would not formally be part of the 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 review procedure nor able to grant authorisations (it 
remains to be seen whether an informal mutual recognition procedure is agreed, as is 
the case now).  Also, as the one-stop-shop provisions will apply only to EU and EEA 
based data protection regulators, a UK based data controller subject to both UK (or 
Swiss) data protection law and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 could face separate 
                                                                                                                                      
and regulates how police and intelligence agencies gain access to it, thereby facilitating the mass 
surveillance of personal data.  A judgment is expected later this year.  
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enforcement action from both the ICO and other EU DPAs (it is anticipated that 
there will be a degree of co-operation and information-sharing). Data controllers such 
as financial service providers, Fintechs and data centres may take the view that their 
compliance burden would be less onerous if they were based in an EU country rather 
than having to ensure compliance with two regulators; mass relocations of businesses 
would inevitably impact upon the UK economy.  
In the longer term, the UK might not find this model satisfactory as, being a ‘third’ 
country, it would also lose its ability to influence and shape any further revisions of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and related legislation in the future, which could be 
significant, given that the UK is viewed as acting as a pragmatic, business friendly 
counterweight to countries that tend to take a more human rights focused approach to 
data protection laws.  
 
 
The ‘Canadian’ Free trade agreement model 
Alternatively, the UK could seek to follow Canada in negotiating a trade agreement 
with the EU.110  For example, Canada and the EU have finalized the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).111  When ratified by each member state, 
(the Canadian government's requirement of a visa for all travellers from Romania and 
Bulgaria has delayed ratification),112 all of Canada’s manufactured exports and 98% 
                                                
110 The Canadian Trade Service Commissioner, ‘Exporting to the EU - A Guide for Canadian 
Business,’ <http://tradecommissioner.gc.ca/european-union-europeenne/market-facts-faits-sur-le-
marche/0000256.aspx?lang=eng> 
111 European Commission, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/> 
112  The Canadian government's requirement of a visa for all travellers from Romania and Bulgaria has 
delayed ratification. The UK Brexit vote may cause further delay; European Commission, ‘Press 
Release: EU visa reciprocity mechanism – Questions and Answers,’ 12 April 2016,  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1346_en.htm> 
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of its agricultural goods will be available for sale within the EU internal market 
without any import tariffs.  Canada will not have to make contributions to the EU 
budget - as Norway does - nor sign up to the free movement of workers - as both 
Norway and Switzerland are required to do.  This aspect of the Canadian free trade 
model would be attractive for UK trade negotiators as it would allow them to restrict 
immigration to the UK, yet have freedom to permit immigration of highly skilled IT 
workers to fill the UK’s digital skills gap.  
Significantly, CETA is the first third-country agreement in which the EU has agreed 
to internal market access in the services sector on the basis of a negative list, meaning 
that all service markets are liberalised except those explicitly excluded.  On the face of 
it, this could provide a promising basis for negotiations between the UK and the EU 
on freedom to provide services.  It does, however, fall short of providing Canadian 
companies with unrestricted access to EU services markets, which is the entitlement 
currently enjoyed by UK companies as a result of our EU membership.  Specifically, 
this trade model does not include passporting – Canadian firms seeking to take 
advantage of the EU financial services ‘passport’ will have to establish a presence in 
the EU and comply with EU regulations. 113   
Therefore, if adopted by the UK, the ‘Canadian model’ would make it more difficult 
for UK-based financial services firms to trade in the EU internal market, as they 
would have to set up subsidiaries in the EU in order to operate.  It is likely they would 
move at least some of their operations outside the UK.  Consequently, industries allied 
to the financial services and digital technology sectors of the economy such as Fintechs 
and data centres would be likely to relocate from the UK to other EU member states, 
                                                
113 V Scarpetta, ‘What could the EU-Canada free trade deal tell us about Brexit?,’ 15 March 2016, 
<http://openeurope.org.uk/today/blog/what-could-the-eu-canada-free-trade-deal-tell-us-about-brexit/> 
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impacting negatively on the UK’s economy.  
Even if it were possible to negotiate such a trade deal it could not be done quickly or 
easily – it took seven years to finalise the Canadian agreement (not yet in force). Such 
a lengthy gap might prove unattractive for UK negotiators as protracted trade 
negotiations could impact negatively on the UK economy resulting in lost investment 
and jobs.  Moreover, Canada found that it had little influence in the negotiation phase 
regarding the terms of the agreement, nor does it have recourse to an independent 
arbiter if problems arise. Given that the UK will be under pressure to negotiate 
quickly, it may find it difficult to ‘hold out’ for preferable terms in a free trade 
agreement with the European Union. 
This approach would be disadvantageous for another reason - the UK would have to 
negotiate separate trade agreements with non-EU countries as any UK-EU free trade 
agreement would not include rights and agreements concluded by the EU in relation 
to third countries (a mammoth task given that the EU has concluded more than two 
hundred Free Trade Agreements with third States or organisations, covering 35% of 
world trade).  The UK would be at a disadvantage, as it would have much less 
bargaining power than the EU.  Furthermore, a CETA-type relationship with the EU 
would result in the UK being removed from the EU’s decision making institutions, so 
its capacity to influence EU law making would be diminished – instead of exerting 
influence through participation in the EU’s legislative processes it would instead have 
to have an impact via diplomacy with the European Commission.  Nevertheless, the 
data protection implications of such a trade relationship are discussed below.  
 
Forthcoming: International Data Privacy Law 
38 
 
Data	Protection	Implications	of	the	Canadian	model	
If the UK implemented the Canadian trade model it could also choose to follow the 
example set by Canada regarding data protection – The Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) was drafted with Directive 
95/46/EC in mind, that is, to provide an adequate level of protection for the purpose 
of data transfers from the EU to Canada.  Thus, the UK could revise the Data 
Protection Act 1998 so that it mirrors provisions in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and 
seek an adequacy determination from the European Commission.  
However, provisions in domestic law - the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers 
Act 2014 (DRIPA), which is currently the subject of a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU in Joined Cases Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v Tom Watson, Peter Brice, Geoffrey Lewis114 may preclude an adequacy 
finding by the European Commission, in which case the UK would either have to 
amend its law, or, alternatively, UK businesses would have to make use of model 
clauses and binding corporate rules, both of which are administratively time-
consuming and complex to effect.115   
Theoretically, the UK could adopt a different (lower) standard of data protection for 
internal UK and non-EU established business.  However, although data protection 
rules are perceived to be burdensome, particularly for small businesses, it is likely that 
the UK business community would exert pressure on the UK government to 
implement data protection laws in the UK that provide an equivalent level of 
protection since Art 3 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 will apply to the processing of 
                                                
114 See note 107. 
115 A29WP, ‘Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 
24 October 1995’ (25 November 2005) WP 114, 11. 
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personal data by controllers and processors established outside the EU116 if their 
processing is related to offering goods or services, including those provided free of 
charge, to EU individuals or to the monitoring of individuals’ behaviour within the 
EU/EEA countries.117 Businesses would not want to see a return to the pre-DPA 1998 
days in which data transfers to the UK could be blocked due to privacy and data 
protection concerns (e.g. the Swedish health ID cards, French-Italy Fiat transfers).  
Additionally, businesses that are keen to stress their privacy and data protection 
credentials to boost consumer confidence may find it a ‘hard sell,’ particularly as the 
principles in Directive 95/46/EC and the forthcoming Regulation (EU) 2016/679 are 
regarded as ‘as a gold standard or ‘spearhead’ reference model for personal data 
protection’118 both in Europe and beyond, with many other countries replicating this 
model e.g. the eleven ‘adequate’ countries, and most recently, Bermuda have been 
influenced by it.119 Thus, digital technology, Fintech and data centre businesses that 
operate on a global basis would question the wisdom of having to comply with 
multiple laws since it would merely increase their compliance burden. 
 
                                                
116 Article 3(1) This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities 
of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing 
takes place in the Union or not.  
117 Article 3(2). 
118 Rand Europe, ‘Review of the European Data Protection Directive,’ <https://ico.org.uk/media/about-
the-ico/documents/1042349/review-of-eu-dp-directive.pdf>;K. Irion, S. Yakovleva and M. Bartl, 
‘Trade and Privacy: Complicated Bedfellows? How to achieve data protection-proof free trade 
agreements,’ Independent study commissioned by BEUC et al.  (Institute for Information Law (IViR), 
Amsterdam, 2016). 
119 Bermuda is in the process of introducing the Personal Information Protection Act 2016 (Bill), which 
takes into account the EU General Data Protection Regulation and the EU-US Privacy Shield, as it 
intends to seek an adequacy finding from the European Commission to allow it to lawfully engage in 
data transfers of EU citizen’s data, 
<http://www.parliament.bm/uploadedFiles/Content/House_Business/Bills/Personal%20Information%2
0Protection%20Bill%202016%20AS%20TABLED%20INTHE%20HOUSE.pdf> 
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The ‘Turkish’ Customs Union model  
The UK could seek to follow Turkey’s example in entering into a customs union120 
with the EU that allows for tariff-free access without quotas to the internal market for 
goods but not public procurement or agriculture (the latter is subject to separate 
bilateral trade concessions negotiated between Turkey and certain EU member 
states).  The advantages of this model are that the UK (like Turkey) would not have to 
make contributions to the EU budget nor facilitate intra-EU migration.  
However, like Turkey, the UK would be required to adopt a common tariff with the 
rest of the EU for third-country goods and would be restricted in its ability to 
conclude agreements with other countries without the EU’s consent.  Moreover, 
under such an arrangement, the UK would have to accept large sections of the EU’s 
acquis communautaire and it is highly likely that the EU would require the UK (as it 
currently does Turkey) to harmonise its laws with those of the EU in relation to 
competition, data protection, intellectual property, and consumer protection.  If the 
UK resisted this, the EU might suspend market access or impose anti-dumping duties, 
to prevent British firms undercutting EU competitors through subsidies or 
deregulatory measures.  Additionally, the UK (like Turkey) would not have any ability 
to influence the composition of those laws, plus the UK (like Turkey) would have to 
comply with the decisions of the CJEU where relevant to these areas, whilst not 
having a Judge as a member of the Court of Justice or as a member of the General 
Court. 
Problematically, this trade model does not cover trade in services so if adopted by the 
UK, the financial and allied Fintech services sectors would suffer as the UK would 
                                                
120 Decision No 1/95 Of The EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing 
the final phase of the Customs Union (96/142/EC), 
<http://www.avrupa.info.tr/fileadmin/Content/Downloads/PDF/Custom_Union_des_ENG.pdf> 
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lose both its passporting rights and right to provide services on equal terms with EU 
members unless the UK negotiated access to the EU internal market for services. 
Even if those hurdles could be overcome, this trade model would not be suitable for 
the UK in the longer term as, like Turkey, it would not be involved in any future Free 
Trade Agreements that the EU might negotiate with other countries and would not 
benefit from them.  It would be obliged to negotiate its own, separate trade 
agreements.  For instance, the UK recently established a ‘Fintech Bridge’ that ‘will 
help UK Fintech firms and investors access the Asian market and expand to the 
Republic of Korea, as well as attracting Korean Fintech companies and investors to 
the UK.’ 121  Whilst this is a welcome development, the UK government will have to 
negotiate separate agreements for UK Fintechs to access other markets, which would 
be a time-consuming and complex process – and in the meantime, financial service 
providers and Fintechs may take the view that it would be simpler and more cost 
effective for them to relocate from the UK to European member states.  
Finally, it is far from certain that the EU would be interested in entering such a trade 
deal with the UK as the arrangements put in place for Turkey are intended as a 
transitional precursor to full EU membership, and given that this model would 
provide only limited access to the EU’s internal market, yet would deprive the UK of 
sovereignty on trade policy, it is difficult to see how it could be attractive to the UK. 
Nevertheless, the potential data protection implications of the Turkish trade model 
are considered below. 
 
                                                
121 Financial Conduct Authority, Co-operation Agreement between Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
and Financial Services Commission of the Republic of Korea (FSC), 22 July 2016,  
<https://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/mou/fca-korean%20fsc-co-operation-agreement.pdf> 
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Data	Protection	Implications	of	the	Turkish	model	
In a step toward accession to the European Union, Turkey enacted its first 
comprehensive data protection law in 2016: Law No. 6668 on the Protection of 
Personal data 122  which is based largely on the EU Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC) and key aspects of the forthcoming Regulation (EU) 2016/679 e.g. the 
national data protection authority will have the power impose fines and prison 
sentences in certain circumstances.  In the unlikely event that the UK seeks to 
implement a customs union trade model it will find that the easiest way to ensure 
continued personal transfers between the EU and UK will involve revising the Data 
Protection Act 1998 to ensure compliance with provisions in Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 and negotiating a bilateral agreement for the free movement of data to 
enable the transfer of personal data between EU/EEA countries and the UK (subject 
to the comments above regarding DRIPA).  
 
The World Trade Organization model 
Currently, the UK is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) but, as with 
all the EU member states, the EU has exclusive competence over common 
commercial policy.123  If the UK left the EU without putting in place any of the 
alternative trade arrangements discussed above, then trade with both the EU and 
almost all the rest of the world would be governed by the WTO General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
                                                
122 The law was passed by the Turkish Parliament 24 March and published in the Official Gazette 7 
April 2016. 
123 Art	3	TFEU. 
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(GATS).124 
Being outside the internal market would enable the UK government to set economic 
policy and regulatory standards without taking account of the preferences of other EU 
members but any divergence in regulation between the UK and the EU would still act 
as a non-tariff barrier to trade and raise the cost of doing business with Europe.  As for 
trade with third countries - it would be governed by the WTO rules, which specify 
that each member must grant the same ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) treatment, that 
is, accord the most favourable tariff and regulatory treatment given to the product of 
any one Member at the time of import or export of “like products” to all other 
Members.  The only exceptions to this principle are that countries can choose to enter 
into free trade agreements such as the EFTA or EU and can give preferential market 
access to developing countries. As a WTO member, the UK’s exports to the EU and 
other WTO members would be subject to the importing countries’ MFN tariffs.  
Ottaviano et al have calculated that this would raise the cost of exporting to the EU 
for UK firms compared with EU membership.125  
Under GATS, WTO members make various reciprocal commitments concerning 
market access and equal treatment for foreign institutions.  However, there is no 
uniform EU external trade policy for services as the EU’s GATS schedule sets out a 
framework for market access but individual countries have derogations in particular 
subsectors and modes of supply, so relying upon GATS would not provide UK 
financial services access to the EU Market on a comparable basis to EU membership. 
                                                
124 The WTO has made far less progress than the EU in liberalising trade in services (negotiations 
between 23 members of the WTO (including the EU) on The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) are 
ongoing); European Commission, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/> 
125 G Ottaviano, JP Pessoa, T Sampson, & J Van Reenen, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Leaving the EU’, 
(Centre for Economic Performance Policy Analysis, 2014) 
<http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/pa016.pdf> 
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In the absence of the EU financial ‘passport’ system, the UK could create its own 
rules for the regulation of banks, but in practice, these would have to be applied on a 
non-discriminatory basis and EU banks would thus have to be treated on the same 
basis as other foreign institutions.  Likewise, UK banks operating within the EU would 
become subject to local supervision - the result - a less favourable outcome for the 
UK’s financial institutions than the EU passporting rules.  For financial services and 
Fintechs currently based in the UK, this is the least favourable trade model, as, like 
the Canadian and Turkish trade models, it does not include passporting in the EU 
internal market.  New Fintechs wishing to serve the wider European market would be 
less likely to establish themselves in the UK, and other financial service providers 
would likely relocate at least part of their operations to EU member states to avail of 
passporting rights. 
Even if political appetite existed for this option it would be an incredibly complex 
process and one that would not necessarily result in economic gains for the UK in all 
instances as once outside the EU the UK would need to negotiate new agreements 
with approximately 60 non-EU countries or organisations (together, these FTAs cover 
about 35 per cent of world trade)126 and the UK acting alone would have much less 
bargaining power than the EU as a collective bloc.  
It would also be a very time-consuming process – for instance, in relation to a possible 
WTO trade deal with China: “One estimate currently doing the rounds is that it will 
take 500 British officials and 10 years to negotiate a fresh trade deal with China”.127  
Plus, the UK doesn’t have any expert trade negotiators - as they are all working in the 
                                                
126 JC Piris, ‘If the UK votes to leave: The seven alternatives to EU membership, (Centre for 
European Reform, 2016),  <https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/pb_piris_brexit_12jan16.pdf> 
127 S Leavenworth, ‘Britons showed 'losing mindset', say Chinese media in swipe at leave vote,’ The 
Guardian, 25 June 2016.  
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European Commission.128 As outlined above, this could impact severely upon the 
financial and digital services sector of the UK economy, making this an unattractive 
option.  Even so, the data protection implications of this model are considered below.    
 
Data	Protection	Implications	of	the	WTO	model	
Given the length of time it would take to negotiate trade deals under the WTO trade 
model, it is highly likely that Regulation (EU) 2016/679 will be in force in the UK, at 
least in the short-to-medium term.  However, if the UK followed the WTO trade 
model, it would be free to revise its data protection laws, and some have speculated 
that the UK might welcome the opportunity to set its own data protection standards, 
ones that are more pragmatic, business friendly and involve less regulatory oversight:  
 
Liberal laws on data protection could encourage investment in areas such as 
artificial intelligence, an area that has a tricky relationship with privacy at the 
best of times and in which Britain excels, as shown by the many acquisitions of 
home-grown AI businesses by the likes of Google.129 
 
In theory, reintroduction of its own legislation (the UK could opt to retain a similar 
model to that currently in place under the DPA 1998) would enable the UK to reduce 
restrictions on personal data flows out of the UK to the rest of the world.  Developing 
trade links with other countries such as Japan, Malaysia, Russia and Singapore would, 
however, be dependent upon the UK continuing to offer  ‘adequate’ levels of 
                                                
128 H Mance, ‘The UK has no trade negotiators, says former Brexit minister: Oliver Letwin says all 
British negotiators are currently employed by the EU,’ Financial Times, 15 July 2016. 
129 J Titcomb, ‘We mustn't let Brexit open a chasm with Europe on data protection,’ The Telegraph, 30 
June 2016. 
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protection for cross-border personal data transfers of at least the level in the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data 1981. 
As for UK-EU personal data transfers, whilst the UK would not (in theory) have to 
comply with CJEU jurisprudence, Art 3 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 would apply 
to the processing of personal data by controllers and processors established outside the 
EU (including the UK) if their processing is related to offering goods or services, 
including those provided free of charge, to EU individuals or to the monitoring of 
individuals’ behaviour within the EU/EEA countries.130  Consequently, not aligning 
UK data protection laws with provisions in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (and any 
related CJEU jurisprudence) could create compliance difficulties for UK established 
organisations seeking to engage with EU citizens because the UK would be obliged to 
seek an ‘adequacy’ finding from the European Commission.  This might be further 
complicated by provisions in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
(DRIPA) that are currently the subject of a preliminary reference to the CJEU in 
Joined Cases Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Tom Watson, Peter Brice, Geoffrey Lewis.131  If an adequacy finding was not 
forthcoming, it would likely prejudice the UK from receiving business from EU 
member states as UK established businesses would have to put arrangements in place 
in order to send personal data to the UK as a ‘third country’ such as reliance upon 
unambiguous consent, model clauses or binding corporate rules to effect data 
transfers.  In addition, the UK would also lose the advantage of the limited "one-stop 
shop" concept introduced by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 meaning compliance with 
                                                
130 Article 3(2). 
131 See note 107. 
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two sets of laws and consequently, exposure to two sets of sanctions for non-
compliance.  In these circumstances, it is likely that some organisations might choose 
to move their business headquarters out of the UK and arrange for another EU 
location to become their “main establishment” and another Data Protection 
Authority to become their lead authority. Thus, any potential competitive advantages 
for UK businesses might be quickly negated by the compliance costs associated with 
the regulatory burden of compliance with different data protection regimes.  For these 
reasons, it is highly likely that the UK government would not introduce amendments 
to UK data protection law that would cause significant deviations from Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing analysis illustrated that leaving the European Union will negatively 
impact the financial services and digital economy sectors of the UK economy. Given 
the importance of these sectors to the UK’s future economic prosperity, steps should 
be taken to mitigate the impact of Brexit.  The discussion confirmed that whilst the 
Norwegian model would be the best alternative trade model (because it would allow 
the UK to retain passporting rights and access to the internal market) and that the 
WTO trade model would be the least favourable trade model for financial and 
Fintech services, none of the trade models discussed are wholly suitable for the UK. 
Thus it is highly likely that the UK will seek to negotiate a unique, hybrid deal that 
‘cherry picks’ elements from existing trade deals to best suit its economic needs. 
However, irrespective of the trade deal the UK Government negotiates upon exit of 
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the European Union, personal data is, and will remain, a key economic asset.132  
Cross-border transfers of personal data will continue to underpin the UK’s economy, 
and if the UK is to retain its position as home to the financial services industry and 
European base for many digital sector technology companies, and allied Fintech and 
data centre industries, it will have to ensure that adequate data protection measures 
are in place to protect the personal data of European citizens.  Accordingly, UK 
established businesses intending to offer goods or services, including those provided 
free of charge, or to monitor the behavior of citizens in EEA countries should 
continue their Regulation (EU) 2016/679 preparedness as part of their global 
regulatory compliance obligations. 
It is to be hoped that the UK Government will recognize the benefits of ensuring that 
UK data protection law is fully compliant with provisions in Regulation (EU) 
2016/679, either through directly implementing its provisions, or closely mirroring 
them in domestic law, not least because its extraterritorial effect will make it 
impossible for companies that seek to establish trade relations with EU member states 
to ignore them.  Forging its own data protection path could also lead to isolation in 
terms of international data protection obligations since countries that have signed and 
ratified the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981 are obligated to provide 
equivalent levels of data protection.  The absence of an adequate or equivalent level of 
data protection would impede cross-border personal data transfers, cause global 
business established in the UK to relocate and prompt them to reconsider future 
investment in the country; the antithesis of trade deal objectives.  
                                                
132 See Note 20, 2 and Note 21, 5.  
